Enable Data Execution Prevention (DEP)
Enables DEP which marks memory regions as non-executable. Prevents code injection attacks from executing arbitrary code in data regions.
- Policy path
- Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Data Execution Prevention
- Supported on
- Windows 10, Windows 11, Windows Server 2016 and later
Enables DEP which marks memory regions as non-executable. Prevents code injection attacks from executing arbitrary code in data regions. Security baselines recommend setting it to 1.
Description
Enable Data Execution Prevention (DEP) is a Windows Group Policy setting located under Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Data Execution Prevention. It applies to the Computer Configuration branch and is classified as a Critical-level policy in the Exploit Protection category.
Enables DEP which marks memory regions as non-executable. Prevents code injection attacks from executing arbitrary code in data regions.
Microsoft sets the default value to 0 while industry security baselines (CIS, NIST, DISA STIG) recommend 1.
Under the hood, this policy is enforced through the Windows registry at HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management using the value name NullPageProtection. Modifying the value directly through regedit.exe or PowerShell produces the same effect as configuring the GPO, but going through Group Policy is preferred so that the setting is centrally managed and survives reboots, image rebuilds, and policy refresh cycles.
In-depth explanation
This is a critical security control. Misconfiguration creates an exploitable attack path that adversaries actively scan for, and a single overlooked endpoint can compromise the entire fleet. Treat it as a hard baseline requirement rather than an optional tuning knob.
The policy is grouped under Exploit Protection, which means it is typically applied through a domain-wide GPO linked at the OU level. In a multi-tenant MSP context, scope it through WMI filters or security group filtering rather than linking at the domain root, so that you can roll out progressively (pilot OU → wider rings → all production).
The setting takes effect after the next Group Policy refresh (gpupdate /force for immediate testing, or by default within ~90 minutes for workstations and ~5 minutes on domain controllers). For computer-side policies a reboot may be required; for user-side policies, a sign-off/sign-on cycle is enough.
Use cases
- Apply organization-wide hardening of exploit protection on all domain-joined Windows endpoints.
- Roll out a CIS Benchmark-aligned baseline targeting 'Enable Data Execution Prevention (DEP)' via a dedicated GPO.
- Reduce attack surface for accounts that handle privileged credentials or sensitive data.
- Standardize the configuration across multiple customer tenants for an MSP-managed fleet.
Security implications
Failing to enforce this policy creates a documented attack path that adversaries actively probe – think Pass-the-Hash, Kerberoasting, NTLM relay, RDP brute-force, LSASS dumping, or token impersonation, depending on the specific control. A single misconfigured endpoint can be enough to pivot to a Domain Admin compromise.
If this policy must remain at default for a legitimate compatibility reason, compensate with a strong detection rule in your EDR/SIEM, isolate the endpoint in its own VLAN, and document the exception with a target remediation date.
How to configure
- Open Group Policy Management Console (
gpmc.msc) on a domain controller or a workstation with RSAT installed. - Create or edit a GPO linked to the OU containing the target computer configurations. We recommend a dedicated baseline GPO (e.g. SEC – Exploit Protection) instead of editing Default Domain Policy.
- Navigate to
Computer Configuration > Administrative Templates > System > Data Execution Prevention. - Open Enable Data Execution Prevention (DEP) and set it to
1. - Click OK and close the editor.
- On the target endpoint, run
gpupdate /force(or wait for the next refresh cycle), then verify withrsop.mscorgpresult /h report.html.
Direct registry path: HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management\NullPageProtection. You can apply the same change with PowerShell:
New-Item -Path 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management' -Force | Out-Null
Set-ItemProperty -Path 'HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory Management' -Name 'NullPageProtection' -Value <value> -Type DWordRegistry mapping
HKLM\System\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\Memory ManagementNullPageProtectionREG_DWORD10