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Event ID 4757InformationMicrosoft-Windows-Security-AuditingWindows

Windows Event ID 4757 – Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing: Universal Security Group Member Removed

Event ID 4757 fires when a member is removed from a universal security group in Active Directory. This audit event tracks group membership changes for security compliance and access control monitoring.

Emanuel DE ALMEIDAEmanuel DE ALMEIDA
18 March 202612 min read 0
Event ID 4757Microsoft-Windows-Security-Auditing 5 methods 12 min
Event Reference

What This Event Means

Event ID 4757 represents a fundamental security audit mechanism in Windows Active Directory environments. When a universal security group loses a member, Windows generates this event to maintain a comprehensive audit trail of group membership modifications. Universal groups differ from global and domain local groups because they can span multiple domains within a forest, making their membership changes particularly significant from a security perspective.

The event structure includes multiple data fields that provide forensic-level detail about the membership removal. The Subject fields identify who performed the action, including their account name, domain, logon ID, and security identifier. The Member fields specify which account was removed, providing both the account name and SID for precise identification. The Group fields detail the target universal group, including its name, domain, and SID.

Windows generates this event on the domain controller that processes the group modification request. In multi-domain controller environments, the event appears on the specific DC that handled the LDAP modification operation. The event timestamp reflects when the directory service committed the change, not when the administrative tool initiated the request. This distinction becomes important when investigating time-sensitive security incidents or correlating events across multiple systems.

The audit event supports both successful and failed operations, though Event ID 4757 specifically indicates successful member removal. Failed attempts generate different event IDs in the 4750-4799 range, allowing administrators to distinguish between successful changes and access denied scenarios.

Applies to

Windows Server 2019Windows Server 2022Windows Server 2025Active Directory Domain Controllers
Analysis

Possible Causes

  • Administrator manually removing a user or group from a universal security group through Active Directory Users and Computers
  • PowerShell scripts executing Remove-ADGroupMember cmdlets against universal groups
  • Automated provisioning systems removing accounts from universal groups during deprovisioning workflows
  • Group Policy Preferences removing members from universal security groups during policy application
  • Third-party identity management systems synchronizing group memberships and removing obsolete members
  • Exchange Server removing distribution group members that are also universal security groups
  • Application service accounts being removed from universal groups during software uninstallation
  • Bulk administrative operations using tools like csvde, ldifde, or dsmod commands
Resolution Methods

Troubleshooting Steps

01

Review Event Details in Event Viewer

Open Event Viewer on the domain controller and navigate to Windows LogsSecurity. Filter for Event ID 4757 to examine recent group membership removals.

# Filter Security log for Event ID 4757
Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4757} -MaxEvents 50 | Format-Table TimeCreated, Id, LevelDisplayName, Message -Wrap

Examine the event details to identify:

  • Subject: Who performed the removal (Account Name, Account Domain, Logon ID)
  • Member: Which account was removed (Member Name, Member SID)
  • Group: Target universal group (Group Name, Group Domain, Group SID)
  • Additional Information: Privileges used for the operation

Cross-reference the Logon ID with Event ID 4624 (successful logon) to determine the source workstation and authentication method used by the administrator.

02

Query Multiple Domain Controllers for Complete Audit Trail

Universal group changes can occur on any domain controller in the forest. Query all DCs to build a complete timeline of group membership modifications.

# Get all domain controllers in the forest
$DCs = (Get-ADForest).Domains | ForEach-Object { Get-ADDomainController -Filter * -Server $_ }

# Query each DC for Event ID 4757
$Results = @()
foreach ($DC in $DCs) {
    try {
        $Events = Get-WinEvent -ComputerName $DC.HostName -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4757; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddDays(-7)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        $Results += $Events | Select-Object @{n='DomainController';e={$DC.HostName}}, TimeCreated, Id, Message
    }
    catch {
        Write-Warning "Cannot query $($DC.HostName): $($_.Exception.Message)"
    }
}

# Display results sorted by time
$Results | Sort-Object TimeCreated -Descending | Format-Table DomainController, TimeCreated, Message -Wrap

This approach ensures you capture all universal group membership removals across the entire Active Directory forest, which is crucial for security investigations.

03

Correlate with Administrative Tool Usage

Identify which administrative tools were used to remove group members by correlating Event ID 4757 with process creation events and authentication logs.

# Find related authentication events for the same Logon ID
$GroupEvent = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4757} -MaxEvents 1
$LogonId = ($GroupEvent.Message | Select-String 'Logon ID:\s+(\S+)').Matches[0].Groups[1].Value

# Find the initial logon event
$LogonEvent = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4624} | Where-Object {
    $_.Message -match "Logon ID:\s+$LogonId"
} | Select-Object -First 1

Write-Host "Group Modification Details:" -ForegroundColor Green
Write-Host "Time: $($GroupEvent.TimeCreated)"
Write-Host "Logon ID: $LogonId"

if ($LogonEvent) {
    Write-Host "\nAuthentication Details:" -ForegroundColor Green
    Write-Host "Logon Time: $($LogonEvent.TimeCreated)"
    Write-Host "Source: $($LogonEvent.Message | Select-String 'Source Network Address:\s+(\S+)' | ForEach-Object {$_.Matches[0].Groups[1].Value})"
    Write-Host "Process: $($LogonEvent.Message | Select-String 'Process Name:\s+(.+)' | ForEach-Object {$_.Matches[0].Groups[1].Value})"
}

Check for concurrent Event ID 4688 (process creation) events to identify specific administrative tools like dsa.msc, powershell.exe, or third-party management applications.

04

Analyze Group Membership History with PowerShell

Create a comprehensive audit report showing the timeline of universal group membership changes for specific groups or users.

# Function to analyze universal group membership changes
function Get-UniversalGroupAudit {
    param(
        [string]$GroupName,
        [string]$MemberName,
        [int]$Days = 30
    )
    
    $StartTime = (Get-Date).AddDays(-$Days)
    $Events = @()
    
    # Get both addition (4756) and removal (4757) events
    $EventIds = @(4756, 4757)
    
    foreach ($EventId in $EventIds) {
        $EventData = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{
            LogName = 'Security'
            Id = $EventId
            StartTime = $StartTime
        } -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
        
        foreach ($Event in $EventData) {
            $Message = $Event.Message
            $GroupNameMatch = ($Message | Select-String 'Group Name:\s+(.+)').Matches[0].Groups[1].Value
            $MemberNameMatch = ($Message | Select-String 'Member Name:\s+(.+)').Matches[0].Groups[1].Value
            
            # Filter by group or member if specified
            if (($GroupName -and $GroupNameMatch -notlike "*$GroupName*") -or 
                ($MemberName -and $MemberNameMatch -notlike "*$MemberName*")) {
                continue
            }
            
            $Events += [PSCustomObject]@{
                Time = $Event.TimeCreated
                Action = if ($EventId -eq 4756) { "Added" } else { "Removed" }
                Group = $GroupNameMatch
                Member = $MemberNameMatch
                Subject = ($Message | Select-String 'Account Name:\s+(.+)').Matches[0].Groups[1].Value
                EventId = $EventId
            }
        }
    }
    
    return $Events | Sort-Object Time -Descending
}

# Usage examples
Get-UniversalGroupAudit -GroupName "Domain Admins" | Format-Table -AutoSize
Get-UniversalGroupAudit -MemberName "john.doe" | Format-Table -AutoSize

This script provides a comprehensive view of universal group membership changes, helping identify patterns and unauthorized modifications.

05

Configure Advanced Monitoring and Alerting

Set up proactive monitoring for critical universal group membership changes using Windows Event Forwarding and custom PowerShell monitoring scripts.

# Create a scheduled task to monitor critical universal groups
$TaskName = "Monitor-CriticalUniversalGroups"
$ScriptPath = "C:\Scripts\Monitor-UniversalGroups.ps1"

# Create the monitoring script
$MonitorScript = @'
$CriticalGroups = @("Domain Admins", "Enterprise Admins", "Schema Admins")
$Events = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName="Security"; Id=@(4756,4757); StartTime=(Get-Date).AddMinutes(-5)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

foreach ($Event in $Events) {
    $GroupName = ($Event.Message | Select-String "Group Name:\s+(.+)").Matches[0].Groups[1].Value
    if ($CriticalGroups -contains $GroupName) {
        $Action = if ($Event.Id -eq 4756) { "ADDED TO" } else { "REMOVED FROM" }
        $Member = ($Event.Message | Select-String "Member Name:\s+(.+)").Matches[0].Groups[1].Value
        $Subject = ($Event.Message | Select-String "Account Name:\s+(.+)").Matches[0].Groups[1].Value
        
        $AlertMessage = "CRITICAL: $Member was $Action $GroupName by $Subject at $($Event.TimeCreated)"
        Write-EventLog -LogName Application -Source "UniversalGroupMonitor" -EventId 1001 -EntryType Warning -Message $AlertMessage
        
        # Send email alert (configure SMTP settings)
        # Send-MailMessage -To "admin@company.com" -Subject "Critical Group Change" -Body $AlertMessage -SmtpServer "smtp.company.com"
    }
}
'@

# Save the script
$MonitorScript | Out-File -FilePath $ScriptPath -Encoding UTF8

# Create event source for custom alerts
New-EventLog -LogName Application -Source "UniversalGroupMonitor" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue

# Create scheduled task to run every 5 minutes
$Action = New-ScheduledTaskAction -Execute "PowerShell.exe" -Argument "-ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File $ScriptPath"
$Trigger = New-ScheduledTaskTrigger -RepetitionInterval (New-TimeSpan -Minutes 5) -RepetitionDuration (New-TimeSpan -Days 365) -At (Get-Date)
$Settings = New-ScheduledTaskSettingsSet -AllowStartIfOnBatteries -DontStopIfGoingOnBatteries -StartWhenAvailable
$Principal = New-ScheduledTaskPrincipal -UserId "SYSTEM" -LogonType ServiceAccount

Register-ScheduledTask -TaskName $TaskName -Action $Action -Trigger $Trigger -Settings $Settings -Principal $Principal -Description "Monitor critical universal group membership changes"

Pro tip: Configure Windows Event Forwarding to centralize Event ID 4757 from all domain controllers to a dedicated log collector for easier monitoring and correlation.

Overview

Event ID 4757 is a security audit event that fires whenever a member is removed from a universal security group in Active Directory. This event is part of Windows advanced audit policy and only appears when object access auditing is enabled for directory service changes. Universal groups are critical in multi-domain Active Directory forests as they can contain members from any domain and be assigned permissions across the entire forest.

This event appears in the Security log on domain controllers and provides detailed information about who removed the member, which group was modified, and which account was removed. The event fires immediately when the group membership change occurs, making it valuable for real-time security monitoring and compliance auditing.

System administrators rely on Event ID 4757 to track unauthorized group membership changes, investigate security incidents, and maintain audit trails for compliance requirements like SOX, HIPAA, or PCI-DSS. The event contains crucial details including the security identifier (SID) of both the group and the removed member, the domain controller that processed the change, and the authentication context of the user who performed the action.

Frequently Asked Questions

What's the difference between Event ID 4757 and similar group membership events?+
Event ID 4757 specifically tracks member removal from universal security groups. Event ID 4756 tracks member additions to universal groups, while 4728/4729 handle global groups and 4732/4733 handle local groups. Universal groups are unique because they can contain members from any domain in the forest and can be assigned permissions across the entire forest, making their audit events particularly important for security monitoring.
Why don't I see Event ID 4757 in my Security log?+
Event ID 4757 only appears when advanced audit policy is enabled for directory service changes. Check your Group Policy settings under Computer Configuration → Policies → Windows Settings → Security Settings → Advanced Audit Policy Configuration → DS Access. Enable 'Audit Directory Service Changes' for Success events. Additionally, ensure you're checking the Security log on domain controllers, not member servers or workstations.
Can Event ID 4757 help identify unauthorized group membership changes?+
Yes, Event ID 4757 is excellent for detecting unauthorized changes. The event includes the Subject fields showing who performed the removal, including their account name, domain, and logon ID. Cross-reference this with Event ID 4624 (logon events) to determine the source workstation and authentication method. Look for removals performed outside normal business hours, from unusual source IPs, or by accounts that shouldn't have administrative privileges.
How can I correlate Event ID 4757 with the administrative tools used?+
Correlate the Logon ID from Event ID 4757 with Event ID 4624 (successful logon) to identify the authentication session. Then check Event ID 4688 (process creation) events with the same Logon ID to see which processes were launched. Common tools include dsa.msc (Active Directory Users and Computers), powershell.exe with AD cmdlets, or third-party identity management applications. The process creation events will show the full command line used.
What should I do if I find suspicious Event ID 4757 entries?+
First, verify the legitimacy by checking with the account owner listed in the Subject fields. Review the timing and context - was this during a planned maintenance window or user offboarding? Check if the removed member still needs access by examining their current role and responsibilities. Investigate the source workstation using the authentication events and look for other suspicious activities from the same account or IP address. Consider temporarily disabling the account that performed the removal if it appears compromised, and review all recent group membership changes performed by that account.
Documentation

References (2)

Emanuel DE ALMEIDA
Written by

Emanuel DE ALMEIDA

Senior IT Journalist & Cloud Architect

Microsoft MCSA-certified Cloud Architect | Fortinet-focused. I modernize cloud, hybrid & on-prem infrastructure for reliability, security, performance and cost control - sharing field-tested ops & troubleshooting.

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