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Windows security monitoring dashboard displaying Event ID 4816 authentication package loading events
Event ID 4816InformationSecurity-AuditingWindows

Windows Event ID 4816 – Security-Auditing: NTLM Authentication Package Loaded

Event ID 4816 indicates that the NTLM authentication package has been loaded by the Local Security Authority (LSA). This security audit event tracks when NTLM authentication capabilities are initialized on Windows systems.

Emanuel DE ALMEIDAEmanuel DE ALMEIDA
18 March 20269 min read 0
Event ID 4816Security-Auditing 5 methods 9 min
Event Reference

What This Event Means

Event ID 4816 represents a security audit event generated by the Windows Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSASS) when it successfully loads the NTLM authentication package. This event is part of the Object Access audit category and requires advanced audit policy configuration to appear in logs.

The NTLM authentication package loading is a critical security event because NTLM, while necessary for backward compatibility, is considered less secure than modern Kerberos authentication. Organizations implementing strict security policies often monitor these events to ensure NTLM usage aligns with their security requirements and to identify systems that may need modernization.

When this event occurs, it indicates that the system is prepared to handle NTLM authentication requests. The event contains details about the authentication package being loaded, the process responsible for loading it, and the security context under which the operation occurred. This information is valuable for security auditing, compliance reporting, and troubleshooting authentication issues in enterprise environments.

The event becomes particularly important in environments where administrators are trying to minimize or eliminate NTLM usage in favor of more secure authentication methods. By monitoring Event ID 4816, security teams can track which systems are loading NTLM capabilities and potentially identify opportunities for security improvements.

Applies to

Windows 10Windows 11Windows Server 2019/2022/2025
Analysis

Possible Causes

  • System startup initializing authentication services and loading required authentication packages
  • Windows service startup requiring NTLM authentication capabilities for legacy application support
  • Application requests for NTLM authentication when connecting to legacy systems or services
  • Domain controller initialization loading authentication packages for client authentication requests
  • IIS web server startup loading authentication modules including NTLM for web application authentication
  • SQL Server or other database services initializing authentication providers including NTLM support
  • Remote Desktop Services startup loading authentication packages for terminal server connections
  • Third-party applications or services explicitly requesting NTLM authentication package loading
Resolution Methods

Troubleshooting Steps

01

Review Event Details in Event Viewer

Start by examining the specific details of Event ID 4816 to understand the context and source of the authentication package loading.

  1. Open Event Viewer by pressing Win + R, typing eventvwr.msc, and pressing Enter
  2. Navigate to Windows LogsSecurity
  3. Filter for Event ID 4816 by right-clicking the Security log and selecting Filter Current Log
  4. Enter 4816 in the Event IDs field and click OK
  5. Double-click on Event ID 4816 entries to view detailed information including:
    • Process Name and ID that loaded the package
    • Authentication Package Name (typically NTLM)
    • Logon ID associated with the loading process
    • Security ID of the account context
  6. Note the timestamp and frequency of these events to identify patterns
Pro tip: Export these events to CSV for analysis using the Action menu if you need to review multiple occurrences across time periods.
02

Query Events Using PowerShell

Use PowerShell to programmatically query and analyze Event ID 4816 occurrences for detailed investigation and reporting.

  1. Open PowerShell as Administrator
  2. Query recent Event ID 4816 entries:
    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4816} -MaxEvents 50 | Format-Table TimeCreated, Id, LevelDisplayName, Message -Wrap
  3. Get detailed event properties for analysis:
    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4816} -MaxEvents 10 | ForEach-Object { $_.Properties }
  4. Filter events by specific time range:
    $StartTime = (Get-Date).AddDays(-7)
    $EndTime = Get-Date
    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4816; StartTime=$StartTime; EndTime=$EndTime}
  5. Export events to CSV for further analysis:
    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4816} -MaxEvents 100 | Select-Object TimeCreated, Id, LevelDisplayName, Message | Export-Csv -Path "C:\Temp\Event4816.csv" -NoTypeInformation
Pro tip: Use -Oldest parameter with Get-WinEvent to retrieve events in chronological order for timeline analysis.
03

Configure Advanced Audit Policy Settings

Ensure proper audit policy configuration to capture Event ID 4816 and related authentication package loading events.

  1. Open Local Group Policy Editor by running gpedit.msc
  2. Navigate to Computer ConfigurationWindows SettingsSecurity SettingsAdvanced Audit Policy ConfigurationAudit Policies
  3. Expand Object Access and locate Audit Authentication Policy Change
  4. Double-click the policy and configure:
    • Enable Configure the following audit events
    • Check both Success and Failure if you want comprehensive logging
  5. Apply the policy using gpupdate /force
  6. Verify audit settings using PowerShell:
    auditpol /get /subcategory:"Authentication Policy Change"
  7. For domain environments, configure the policy at the domain level through Group Policy Management Console
Warning: Enabling comprehensive audit logging can generate significant log volume. Monitor disk space and configure log retention policies appropriately.
04

Analyze NTLM Usage and Security Implications

Investigate the security implications of NTLM package loading and assess opportunities for authentication modernization.

  1. Check current NTLM audit settings in registry:
    Get-ItemProperty -Path "HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\MSV1_0" -Name "AuditReceivingNTLMTraffic" -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
  2. Enable NTLM auditing to track usage patterns:
    • Open Local Security Policy (secpol.msc)
    • Navigate to Local PoliciesSecurity Options
    • Configure Network security: Restrict NTLM: Audit NTLM authentication in this domain
    • Set to Enable auditing for domain accounts or Enable auditing for all accounts
  3. Monitor NTLM usage events (Event IDs 8004, 8005, 8006) alongside 4816:
    Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='System'; Id=8004,8005,8006} -MaxEvents 20
  4. Review applications and services requiring NTLM:
    • Check IIS authentication settings in %windir%\system32\inetsrv\config\applicationHost.config
    • Review SQL Server authentication configuration
    • Identify legacy applications in application event logs
  5. Document NTLM dependencies for security assessment and modernization planning
Pro tip: Use Microsoft's NTLM blocking guidance and tools to gradually reduce NTLM usage in your environment while monitoring Event ID 4816 patterns.
05

Implement Monitoring and Alerting for Authentication Events

Set up comprehensive monitoring and alerting for Event ID 4816 and related authentication package events for security operations.

  1. Create a PowerShell monitoring script:
    # Monitor Event ID 4816 and send alerts
    $Events = Get-WinEvent -FilterHashtable @{LogName='Security'; Id=4816; StartTime=(Get-Date).AddMinutes(-15)} -ErrorAction SilentlyContinue
    if ($Events) {
        $EventCount = $Events.Count
        $LatestEvent = $Events[0]
        Write-Host "Found $EventCount NTLM package loading events in last 15 minutes"
        # Add your alerting logic here (email, SIEM integration, etc.)
    }
  2. Configure Windows Event Forwarding for centralized collection:
    • Run wecutil qc to configure the collector
    • Create subscription for security events including 4816
    • Configure source computers using winrm quickconfig
  3. Set up custom views in Event Viewer:
    • Right-click Custom Views and select Create Custom View
    • Filter for Event ID 4816 and related authentication events
    • Save the view for quick access
  4. Integrate with SIEM solutions using Windows Event Log forwarding:
    # Configure event log forwarding to SIEM
    wevtutil sl Security /rt:false
    wevtutil sl Security /ab:true
  5. Create scheduled tasks for regular monitoring:
    • Use Task Scheduler to run monitoring scripts
    • Configure triggers based on event occurrence or time intervals
    • Set up email notifications for critical authentication events
Warning: Ensure monitoring solutions have appropriate permissions and consider the performance impact of frequent event log queries on production systems.

Overview

Event ID 4816 fires when the Local Security Authority (LSA) loads the NTLM authentication package during system startup or when authentication services are initialized. This event appears in the Security log and is part of Windows advanced security auditing framework introduced to track authentication package loading activities.

The NTLM (NT LAN Manager) authentication package provides backward compatibility for legacy authentication scenarios where Kerberos cannot be used. When LSA loads this package, it enables the system to handle NTLM authentication requests from clients, services, or applications that require this older authentication protocol.

This event typically occurs during system boot, service startup, or when specific applications request NTLM authentication capabilities. System administrators monitor this event to track authentication package initialization, ensure proper security policy compliance, and investigate potential authentication-related issues in mixed environments with legacy systems.

Frequently Asked Questions

What does Event ID 4816 indicate about system security?+
Event ID 4816 indicates that the NTLM authentication package has been loaded by the Local Security Authority, which means the system is prepared to handle NTLM authentication requests. While this is normal system behavior, it's important from a security perspective because NTLM is considered less secure than Kerberos. Security administrators monitor this event to track when systems are enabling NTLM capabilities, which helps in security assessments and planning authentication modernization efforts. The event itself doesn't indicate a security issue, but it provides visibility into authentication package initialization that's valuable for security auditing and compliance.
Why do I see Event ID 4816 frequently during system startup?+
Event ID 4816 appears frequently during system startup because the Local Security Authority (LSA) loads various authentication packages as part of the normal boot process. Windows loads NTLM and other authentication packages to ensure the system can handle different types of authentication requests from services, applications, and network connections. This is expected behavior, especially in enterprise environments where backward compatibility with legacy systems requires NTLM support. The frequency during startup is normal and indicates that authentication services are initializing properly. However, if you see these events at unusual times outside of startup or service initialization, it may warrant investigation.
How can I reduce NTLM usage indicated by Event ID 4816?+
To reduce NTLM usage, start by identifying which applications and services are triggering NTLM package loading through Event ID 4816 analysis. Enable NTLM auditing using Group Policy to track actual NTLM authentication attempts (Events 8004-8006). Modernize applications to use Kerberos authentication where possible, configure IIS to prefer Kerberos over NTLM, and update SQL Server connections to use integrated Windows authentication with Kerberos. Implement NTLM blocking policies gradually, starting with outgoing NTLM traffic restrictions, then incoming restrictions. Use Microsoft's NTLM reduction guidance and tools like the NTLM blocking recommendations. Monitor Event ID 4816 patterns before and after changes to ensure authentication functionality remains intact while reducing NTLM dependency.
Should I be concerned about Event ID 4816 appearing in my security logs?+
Event ID 4816 appearing in security logs is generally not a cause for concern as it represents normal authentication package loading behavior. This is an informational event that indicates proper system functionality rather than a security issue. However, you should pay attention to the context and frequency of these events. Unusual patterns, such as frequent NTLM package loading outside of normal startup times, or loading by unexpected processes, may warrant investigation. The event is valuable for security auditing and compliance purposes, helping administrators understand when and why NTLM capabilities are being initialized. Focus on using this information for security planning and authentication modernization rather than treating it as an immediate security concern.
How do I configure audit policies to capture Event ID 4816 consistently?+
To consistently capture Event ID 4816, configure the Advanced Audit Policy for 'Audit Authentication Policy Change' under Object Access category. Use Group Policy Editor (gpedit.msc) to navigate to Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Advanced Audit Policy Configuration > Audit Policies > Object Access. Enable both Success and Failure auditing for comprehensive coverage. Apply the policy using 'gpupdate /force' and verify settings with 'auditpol /get /subcategory:"Authentication Policy Change"'. For domain environments, configure this at the domain level through Group Policy Management Console. Ensure adequate log retention policies are in place as authentication events can generate significant log volume. Consider using Windows Event Forwarding to centralize these events for better analysis and retention management.
Documentation

References (2)

Emanuel DE ALMEIDA
Written by

Emanuel DE ALMEIDA

Senior IT Journalist & Cloud Architect

Microsoft MCSA-certified Cloud Architect | Fortinet-focused. I modernize cloud, hybrid & on-prem infrastructure for reliability, security, performance and cost control - sharing field-tested ops & troubleshooting.

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